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SECURITY INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: NATO'S COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF) CONCEPT

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of the paper is to examine NATO's Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Concept and analyze its application to meet security tasks into the 21st century. NATO adopted the CJTF concept in 1994 in anticipation of using the U.S. Joint Task Force (JTF) doctrine in the United Nations relief mission in Bosnia. Since then, NATO has completed the evaluation and validation phases of the CJTF concept and are now in the full implementation phase with the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) expected in 2002. The CJTF concept is more than a command and control mechanism with a deployable communication information system. The CJTF concept is the instrument that gives NATO the flexibility it needs to conduct peace support operations in and out of area with non-NATO members and Article 5 missions within the alliance. This paper will examine how the CJTF concept can be employed within and outside of NATO territory. NATO's CJTF concept will provide the critical capabilities for a military headquarters to meet the security tasks of the 21st century.

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SECURITY INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: NATO'S COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF) CONCEPT

NATO's capability to undertake new missions to respond to a broad spectrum of possible threats...and to strengthen Alliance defense capabilities by ensuring forces are more mobile, sustainable and able to engage effectively on the full spectrum of NATO missions.

—The Alliance New Strategic Concept 1999

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will provide the critical capabilities for a military headquarters to conduct the full spectrum of operations into the 21st century. The CJTF concept is more than a command and control mechanism with a deployable communication information system. The CJTF concept is the doctrine, equipment, command and staff structure, and foundation for a multi-national headquarters to conduct the multi-faceted tasks in military operations. The CJTF concept can be used within the existing static headquarters, deployed within the NATO boundaries or deployed outside of NATO. The CJTF headquarters has the logistical support, communications, and structure design to handle military missions led by NATO or even the European Union (EU). This paper will describe the capabilities of the CJTF concept and its application to NATO's Military Command structure in relation to the new strategic concept. The CJTF concept is essential to NATO to meet security tasks into the 21st century.

U.S. INTERESTS

How important is NATO and the CJTF concept to the U.S.? According to the 1999, National Security Strategy (NSS), NATO is categorized as an important national interest. "European Stability is vital to our security.... NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security."

The U.S. economic ties to Europe are significant and cannot be understated. This market can only remain profitable through a secure a stable market built on mutual interest and trust. The following figures demonstrate the importance of Europe to the U.S. economy and viseversa:

- US/Europe trade is over \$250 billion annually and is 30% of U.S. exports
- One half of the world's goods are produced by the U.S. and Europe
- Over three million domestic jobs are tied to Europe
- U.S. companies employ three million people in Europe

- 60% of all U.S. investments are in Europe
- 90% of all humanitarian aide comes from the U.S. and Europe³

Our NSS clearly states that NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security." The National Military Strategy (NMS) states that our interest in NATO is important. The NMS states: "our military must: promote peace and stability and, when necessary, to defeat adversaries that threaten the United States, our interest, or our allies." On most occasions, our forces will operate as a joint team and must seek to operate alongside alliance or coalition forces. The CJTF concept meets and exceeds our NMS objectives and U.S. interest as they apply to NATO. The U.S. interest continues to be re-evaluated by regions and the protection of our European interests remains top priority.

CHANGES IN EUROPE AND IN NATO

What changes in Europe have required NATO to modify the 50-year old military structure, organization and mission? Since the successful defeat of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in the Cold War, the threat of a Major Theater War (MTW) in Europe has diminished. The thought of large tank formations rolling west through the Fulda Gap have all but vanished. The General Defense Plans (GDP) of the past, have now been cataloged and microfiched in the history books. As a result of this reduced threat, the security architecture in Europe has been changed forever.

NATO's new Strategic Concept was adopted in April 1999 at the NATO Summit. During this historical summit in Washington, D.C., the North Atlantic Council (NAC) reaffirmed that collective defense remains the core purpose of NATO. Simply stated, "we will continue building a stronger and broader Euro-Atlantic community of democracies - a community where human rights and fundamental freedoms are upheld; where borders are increasingly open to people, ideas and commerce; where war becomes unthinkable." This isn't the first time NATO has addressed human rights, but admits that this is the first strategy that addresses them as an objective. During the 1999 summit, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were welcomed into NATO bringing the number of members to nineteen. This is only the first of many more potential NATO expansion opportunities in the 21st century. NATO expansion means more capabilities, more resources, and more multi-national military forces to integrate. The 1999 Strategic Concept also identified initiatives through which NATO provides European Allies (WEU/EU) with NATO common assets and capabilities for military operations "when the alliance as a whole is not engaged." The CJTF concept is the key to integrate the new Strategic Concept and NATO expansion. The integration of Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland

military forces and national support for the mission in Kosovo is a good example of how NATO applied the CJTF concept successfully. Within a few months after the three new members acceptance into NATO, they were deploying on a NATO mission with non-NATO nations in support of UN sanctions.

There have been many changes in NATO's recent history to improve their military capabilities to meet security challenges of the 21st century. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has improved their military capabilities through several bold initiatives. NATO has maintained their ability to conduct the primary mission of collective defense and added the requirement of conducting two small-scale operations simultaneously. The new initiatives include Partnership for Peace (PfP), the European Security Defense Identity (ESDI), Defense Capability Initiative (DCI), Force Structure Review, and the CJTF concept. It is not important to address each of these initiatives or prioritize their capabilities. However, the CJTF concept is an integral part of all these initiatives.

In order for NATO to maintain their military structure valid and relevant to future security issues, changes had to be made to meet the European situation. Change is not always easy for a large organization. Especially when they have been conducting business in the same manner for so many years. It is the same within NATO. The traditions, doctrine, redundant structure and multiple agreements that NATO developed to thwart Soviet aggression since 1949, would be difficult to change overnight. With that said, NATO did recognize the significance of multinational organizations and coalition building that has maintained the alliance through the Cold War years. NATO's CJTF initiative is the most significant change in NATO's application of military force. This concept addresses the ability to conduct operations outside of the collective defense of the alliance and with non-NATO members. The CJTF headquarters is the thread that seamlessly links the military formations, non-governmental organizations, international guidance, component commands and locations together.

The CJTF theory was first suggested to NATO by Les Aspin, then the U.S. Secretary of Defense, at an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in October 1993 in Travemunde, Germany. One of the primary reasons for the U.S. recommending the multi-national, combined, and joint CJTF structure was to assist in promoting ESDI and to promote "burdensharing" across all European nations. In response, the Alliance has taken steps to reduce the military force structure, reduce military headquarters, modify the command structure, and participate in operations outside the alliance borders. The reduction from 65 to 20 military command headquarters is an example of the positive and necessary steps NATO is making to remain current, and relevant while improving effectiveness. NATO members committed forces

during the Gulf War in support of the U.S. led coalition. Desert Strom/Shield is an example of multi-national, joint and combined coalition headquarters using U.S. doctrine that worked very well. NATO for the first time participated in a United Nations (UN) directed, out-of-area military operation other than war (MOOTW) in Bosnia in 1995 and most recently in Kosovo. The organization that was originally developed and formed for the collective defense of Europe, has taken large steps to adapt and to meet current and future security requirements. A CJTF headquarters emphasizes and highlights those capabilities that continue make NATO a force of choice for worldwide missions.

CJTF CONCEPT AND REQUIREMENTS

What is NATO's CJTF and what capabilities does it offer a military headquarters?

NATO's CJTF definition: "A CJTF is a multi-national (Combined) and multi-service (Joint) task force, task-organized and formed for the full range of Alliance's military missions, which require multi-national and multi-service command and control by CJTF HQ. It is designed to include elements from non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations." The CJTF headquarters and doctrine can be applied to an Article 5 collective defense mission, but is primarily used for non-Article 5 operations just outside or even well outside NATO's region.

NATO adapted the CJTF theory in January 1994 at the summit meeting in Brussels. ¹⁸ Immediately thereafter, NATO began planning for potential involvement in the Balkans using a multi-national, joint and combined headquarters that included non-NATO members. After fifty years of collective defense, NATO had not developed any joint peace support operation doctrine to conduct non-Article 5 missions. The U.S. had a proven joint military doctrine that established a headquarters called a Joint Task Force (JTF) for use in a MTW or MOOTW. NATO quickly modified the existing U.S. doctrine to meet their needs and Bosnia mission. ¹⁹ The relief of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, called for the immediate deployment of a multi-national implementation force (IFOR) to conduct the military aspects of the Bosnian Peace Agreements. ²⁰ Allied Forces South quickly formed and mounted a CJTF headquarters and deployed forward to Sarajevo. ²¹ The Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) that provided forces to IFOR included many non-NATO countries. For some countries, this was the first time operating side-by-side with NATO forces instead of looking across the international border at each other.

NATO has identified a requirement for one sea-based CJTF headquarters and up to two land-based CJTF headquarters.²² The sea-based parent headquarters is Strike Fleet Atlantic and the two land-based parent headquarters are the two Regional Command (RC) headquarters of Allied Command Europe (ACE): Allied Forces North and Allied Forces South.²³

The current NATO policy calls for military forces to be able to conduct two small-scale non-Article 5 crisis response operations (CRO) and one Article 5 operation simultaneously. ²⁴ If a parent headquarters is activated for non-Article 5 missions out-of-area, the headquarters is not relieved of their Article 5 mission requirements. The Regional Command headquarters have a robust staff structure capable of handling both missions. This capability is the main reason they were selected as CJTF nucleus providers. When deployed as a CJTF headquarters, the remaining staff is still required to maintain the static headquarters structure for the primary mission of collective defense. ²⁵

CJTF COMPONENTS

The CJTF concept is made up of a personnel manning document, individual and headquarters training requirements, a deployable command post, and a deployable communication and information system. To date, several of these components and doctrine employment are still being developed. However, the most current application is described in the following paragraphs.

PERSONNEL MANNING DOCUMENT

The CJTF headquarters is formed around the core elements (the "nucleus") from a selected parent headquarters of a NATO Regional Command headquarters. This nucleus staff includes the primary staff members for a CJ1 through CJ9 structure, key command positions, and a support command element. The parent headquarters normally fills 25-30 percent of the CJTF headquarters manning structure. The parent headquarters fills the key command positions to ensure continuity of effort and familiarity with procedures and decision-making tools of the headquarters. The CJTF structure additionally provides the flexibility needed to accommodate key or command positions for multi-national TCNs participation. This is a very important issue when one considers the political influence and military capabilities the TCNs bring to the headquarters and what staff or command position they occupy. The CJTF manning strength can vary by the type of mission being conducted, the type of parent headquarters selected; a land-based or sea-based headquarters, and how many TCNs are involved. A typical planning figure for a land-based CJTF headquarters averages six hundred people (including the support command element). TCNs and other NATO headquarters will augment the CJTF headquarters to match the mission and needs of the command with one exception. A seabased CJTF headquarters is limited in size due to the capacity onboard ship. This should not be viewed as a significant issue, but a constraint. Other NATO headquarters will provide

augmentation using a modular approach to meet the requirements of the specific mission (i.e., joint visitors bureau, communication assets, legal office, Civil Military Coordination Center). The modular method means that distinct offices or capabilities can be added to the CJTF headquarters as required. Another method of augmentation is the vertical slice method. Using the vertical slice method, the multi-nationality of the forces employed is equally represented on the CJTF staff. This representation can be in the form of liaison officers or complete staff sections. An example of a vertical slice method would be a helicopter coordination cell for the nation contributing helicopter assets to the CJTF headquarters.

It is a national responsibility to fill the CJTF manning document. Each nation is required to and maintains a database of qualified personnel who are CJTF members and those who are not assigned to NATO headquarters, but are trained and could augment if needed. The length of assignment to the CJTF nucleus staff varies by nation.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

CJTF nucleus staff personnel must be trained and ready to deploy within 30 days and augmentation staff elements within 40 days.²⁸ The exact task list and frequency for each position is still under development. However, the training requirements for the CJTF nucleus individuals can include familiarity with the computer information system, standard operating procedures for the staff assigned and decision-making models used by the CJTF headquarters. The frequency of training for an individual should be a minimum of one annual CJTF staff-training event to qualify for a nucleus position.

Each CJTF parent headquarters must maintain a trained and ready nucleus staff to meet the deployment timeline. The CJTF parent headquarters training requirements are to participate in an exercise as a player headquarters sponsored by the next higher headquarters. The CJTF exercise schedule should train each parent headquarters a minimum of once every two years. NATO headquarters would be the CJTF's higher headquarters for these exercises and would validate the CJTF readiness level and staff functions. If time permits, the CJTF headquarters could receive a validated exercise given by their higher headquarters before deployment. This CJTF training and exercise schedule continues to be adjusted to compensate for the already busy Article 5 exercise schedule and the increasing Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercise schedule.

DEPLOYABLE COMMAND POST AND DEPLOYABLE COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEM (CIS)

The CJTF headquarters is a highly mobile and capable command and control organization with state of the art communication connectivity. The deployable command post is comprised of 5 meter and 10 meter mobile shelters. The 5-meter shelters have workspace to accommodate 4 personnel and computers. The 10-meter shelters provide 7 workstations and both shelters are equipped with an environmental control unit that provides heat or air conditioning as required. The shelters are modular in design to facilitate multiple configurations and limited space considerations. The shelters can be quickly transported by vehicle, air, or sea. Each shelter is wired for multiple types of electrical power and has an intercommunication system built-in. The shelters provide a command center capability that can be independent of any existing infrastructure. NATO successfully used this type of command post in Sarajevo during the transfer of mission from IFOR to SFOR in 1996.²⁹

The communication systems used by the CJTF headquarters varies between a sea-based headquarters and a land-based headquarters. One of the sea-based CJTF communications architecture is aboard the USS Mount Whitney. This capability was successfully employed during the NATO exercise Strong Resolve 98.³⁰ The Strong Resolve 98 exercise was used during the evaluation phase of the CJTF concept to validate a sea-based headquarters.

Much of the deployable communications and information systems used for the CJTF headquarters are the same systems required for Article 5 missions. In an effort to capture the common requirements and multiple applications between the CJTF and Article 5, NATO has combined the costs of the equipment. Unfortunately, when you review the original planning figures for a CJTF headquarters you see that today the cost has quadrupled. The original planning cost of the CJTF deployable CIS was 40 millions of NATO accounting units (MNAUs) and now combined with Article 5 requirements is estimated at 180 MNAUs.³¹ The NATO Contingency Assets Pool (NCCAP) include:

- 13 Transportable Satellite Ground Terminals
- 21 Communication Modules- (19 for deployment and 2 for training)
- ACE Deployable C2 System & Deployable Command Post Staff Shelters
- 22 High Frequency Radio Systems
- 32 Line of Sight Systems
- Support vehicles
- 21 Information Services Modules (ISM)

• Network Extension Equipment³²

NATO's common funding program calls for each nation to contribute to those purchases that reflect the interest of all member countries.³³ Unfortunately, if members do not invest in critical assets such as the CJTF deployable command post and deployable CIS, the implementation phase could be in jeopardy. This will have a negative effect on the acquisition timetable to meet the present target of IOC in 2002. The U.S. commitment to the CJTF program has remained constant and fully supports the ESDI elements in NATO.³⁴

APPLICATIONS OF THE CJTF CONCEPT IN A NATO LED MISSION

What capabilities does the CJTF concept give a RC headquarters in a collective defense mission and non-Article 5 missions? The new Military Command structure of NATO has embedded the combined and joint staff capabilities in the static RC headquarters and the Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRC) headquarters. These staffs include CJ1 through CJ9 functions that at the RC level have a requirement to form the nucleus staff for CJTF missions. If an Article 5 mission develops, NATO has the flexibility to decide whether a RC or JSRC in that region has the lead.

The Allied Command Europe has geographically divided the RCs area of responsibility for Article 5 missions. AFNORTH's responsibility is north of the Alps and AFSOUTH's is south of the Alps. This geographic focus is part of the reduction from 65 headquarters to 20. If an Article 5 mission was in AFNORTH's area of responsibility, the CJTF nucleus staff could quickly be established and used to command and control the mission from within the static headquarters in Brunsum, Netherlands. Another option; AFNORTH could activate the CJTF nucleus staff and deploy, using the command post and deployable CIS, to command and control the mission away from the static headquarters. This option does not eliminate the ability or need to use an underground headquarters facility for the CJTF, but does give a mobile command and control capability until the remainder of the CJTF can be assembled.

NATO RC headquarters have performed CJTF functions in non-Article 5 missions since late 1995. AFSOUTH was selected as the Theater Command headquarters for the NATO mission in Bosnia. AFSOUTH used NATO's early version of the CJTF concept to deploy a multi-national, combined and joint headquarters to Sarajevo that included non-NATO members. The IFOR mission was called Operation Joint Endeavor. The land, air, and maritime component commands were also integrated jointly with non-NATO members for Joint Endeavor. The AFSOUTH headquarters and Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC-land component headquarters) transferred mission authority to the second NATO CJTF headquarters in late

1996. This second NATO headquarters was formed, mounted, and trained from the Central Region Land Component Headquarters, LANDCENT. LANDCENT then became the Stability Force (SFOR) headquarters with the change in mission from IFOR.³⁷ LANDCENT is now organized as a JSRC within AFNORTH.

The components of NATO's CJTF concept, are capable of providing multi-national command and control to a lower command headquarters (JSRC) A JSRC headquarters could assume the mission to provide the nucleus staff and lead the multi-national headquarters in a collective defense Article 5 mission or a non-Article 5 mission. A JSRC could be selected as a follow-on CJTF headquarters as being currently conducted in the Balkans.

The new Military Command Structure replaced most of the regionally focused Component Commands with JSRCs. The JSRCs are now organized with CJ1 through CJ9 structures like the RCs. This allows greater flexibility in NATO's command and control structure to lead multiple joint forces: land, air and sea forces simultaneously. However, the JSRCs lack staff robustness and would require augmentation to conduct a non-Article 5 mission. Unlike the RCs, the JSRCs have not been designated or identified to be a parent headquarters for a CJTF. An example of how a JSRC could be a CJTF; when LANDCENT formed the nucleus of SFOR headquarters, the staff augmentation requirements were the same as AFSOUTH's with one exception. LANDCENT was a combined land component headquarters and was not organized in CJ1 through CJ9 staffs in their static headquarters. LANDCENT required augmentation for both their SFOR staff and their static headquarters staff. The SFOR personnel manning document was modeled after the existing AFSOUTH structure with some slight variations. In an effort to reduce NATO forces in BOSNIA, LANDCENT was to assume both the land component headquarters mission from the ARRC and AFSOUTH's mission as Theater Headquarters. This mission could be executed more efficiently today because of the joint structure and design of the JSRCs. The embedded joint staff structure of the JSRC facilitates the transition to a CJTF for collective defense and non-Article 5 missions. A JSRC headquarters would have some difficulty maintaining their collective Article 5 mission focus while simultaneously performing duties as a CJTF parent headquarters with significant augmentation. Additionally, a JSRC's span of control is limited to a theater size employment.

APPLICATION OF THE CJTF CONCEPT IN A NON-NATO LED MISSION.

During the 1999 summit, NATO reaffirmed their commitment to building the ESDI within the Alliance.³⁸ The goals for ESDI are: "to improve the European contribution to NATO-led operations; and secondly, to give Europe a capability to act where NATO as an organization is

not engaged. ESDI is designed to improve the flexibility of Euro-Atlantic crisis management."³⁹ This is not in conflict with the CJTF concept, but enhances the capabilities and flexibility of the European Security Defense Plan (ESDP). The provisions of the 1999 Strategic Concept further promulgates the CJTF concept and the need for a structure that provides the continuity between NATO and EU for EU-led missions.

EU's goal to create an autonomous military force of 60,000 under its own command by 2003 is the Headline goal.⁴⁰ This force is designed to deploy 60,000 troops, with associated air and naval elements, within 60 days and should be sustainable in the field for at least 1 year.⁴¹ The Headline Goal force has no plans to assume the collective defense of Europe mission.⁴² The Headline Goal forces are the same forces that nations have apportioned to NATO.

So where does a NATO CJTF headquarters fit into this scenario? The desire for a EU Headline Goal force came about after the crisis in Kosovo. NATO was not unanimous in their commitment for support to the Kosovo crisis and the EU members wanted to act without NATO's unanimous decision. In 1992, the Petersburg Task were developed, approved and identified as those missions that a WEU/EU-led force could undertake. The Petersburg tasks are: (1) humanitarian assistance, (2) rescue tasks, (3) peacekeeping tasks and tasks assigned to combat forces in the context of crisis management situations, including peacemaking.⁴³ It is the EU's desire to have a European military capability that could conduct Petersburg tasks.

NATO has stated that a EU-led Petersburg tasks mission could be possible after NATO has determined that they will not participate. The Deputy Commander, Supreme Allied Command Europe (DSACUER) has been nominated to be the commander of the EU-led mission. ESDI has established a parallel planning and common operating system to be established between the EU Headline Goal force and NATO forces. The EU does not have a standing headquarters to lead military forces and does not intend to develop one. The NATO CJTF concept could be the instrument that bridges the gap and provides the command and control link between EU and their Headline Goal forces.

What other alternatives for command and control does the EU have if a NATO CJTF is not used? A lead nation concept could be used to command and control the Headline Goal forces. This means that one nation would have the responsibility of mounting a multi-national headquarters from their national headquarters and form an ad hoc headquarters. The disadvantages of the lead nation ad hoc headquarters are easy to identify. The common operating systems and decision-making tools to be used for the ad hoc headquarters would only be known by the lead nation—no standard operating procedures. The staff training, augmentation and integration would be haphazard at best. The ability to command and control

non-NATO forces would be problematic because a lack of confidence in the ad hoc headquarters by TCNs and unfamiliarity of forces capabilities and limitations. There are few nations that maintain a CJTF sea-based headquarters capability. There are even fewer lead nation candidates that posses a strategic communications capability to satisfy long range or long duration and high data transfer requirements of a CJTF. However, the lead nation option is the least expensive alternative to the NATO CJTF headquarters for non-NATO led missions. The most preferred option, that presents the least amount of risk to mission and forces, calls for a standing CJTF headquarters. Unfortunately, NATO does not see a need for an additional headquarters at this time. The CJTF concept remains the most qualified and preferred option to lead a multi-national force in a crisis management situation or collective defense without significant risks to the mission and forces.

CONCLUSION

The most important capability for NATO to meet future crisis responses and the employment of military forces in the 21st century is a CJTF. The NATO CJTF bridges the gap between Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions and provides the multi-national command and control for the NATO Military Command structure, NATO and non-NATO forces. NATO changed its Strategic Concept in 1999 to include the possibility of forces being led by the European Union. A NATO CJTF provides the same command and control capability to a European Union-led operation when NATO is otherwise not engaged. The NATO CJTF is designed to provide the communications systems and connectivity to ensure cohesion and flexibility of a multi-national, joint and combined organization. Because coalition military formations are used more today than ever, the need for an integrated, joint, and combined headquarters structure within NATO was needed. The NATO CJTF structure has the combined effect and staff integration that a multi-national military formation needs to command and control maneuver forces and give assistance to international agencies. NATO has applied the CJTF theory to get the maximum synergistic effect of its capabilities well into the 21st century. NATO has applied their alliance experience and lessons learned of the past 50 years to the CJTF concept requirements with promising results. The CJTF capability and equipment provides for rapid mobility to deploy out-of-area, or in-theater, and with a trained staff. NATO has demonstrated in Bosnia and Kosovo that a NATO-led CJTF headquarters can be used in non-Article 5 missions. NATO has agreed to allow non-NATO led missions using NATO forces when NATO is not engaged. The NATO CJTF is the key component that will facilitate a nonNATO led mission with NATO forces. All NATO PfP exercises now use a CJTF headquarters personnel-manning document as the basic manning document as a tool for integration and introduction to NATO headquarters and orders process. Both Article 5 and non-Article 5 exercises include the CJTF headquarters as the war fighting/peacekeeping formation.

The important U.S. interest of regional stability in Europe will continue to improve as a result of military-to-military contact, cooperative planning, shared equipment and technological advances, and from working side-by-side on multi-national military operations. Whether it is a disaster relief mission in Africa or a peacekeeping mission within Europe, the NATO CJTF has the capabilities and functions required to meet security tasks into the 21st century.

As of January 2001, NATO has paused the implementation of the CJTF concept. The reason for the pause is to re-look the CJTF design and cost to ensure it still meets the alliance goals and priorities. ABTO has cited conflicting and competing requirements of the NATO CJTF with other initiatives such as the new Military Command Structure, NATO Force Structure and the Air Command and Control headquarters as a reason for the pause. Secondly, the cost of the equipment has almost quadrupled since the 1994 approval of the CJTF concept. The Initial Operation Concept (IOC) of 2002 and Full Operational Concept (FOC) of 2004 can no longer be met without all nations commitment and contribution to the common funded CIS items. This pause should not be interpreted as a lack of commitment to the CJTF concept, but an opportunity to combine initiatives and capabilities to get the best return on their investment.

WORD COUNT: 4834

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